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The US-China WTO cases explained
InAugust the WTO released its panel report on the second of two cases that the US brought against
China in 2007. Peter K Yu explains what they mean for IPowners
cerning the US-China dispute over the trading rights and distribution services for
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this year, a different WTO panel addressed a related US-China dispute on the protection and enforcement of IP.
The recent decision provides an excellent opportunity to revisit the earlier decision, exploring its implications for IP protection and enforcement. That decision
focuses on three main issues: the high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in the IP area; the failure of the Chinese authorities to properly dispose of confiscated infringing goods; and the denial of copyright protection to works that have
not been authorised for publication or distribution within the country.

Thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties
Under the TRIPs Agreement, each WTO member is required to apply criminal procedures and penalties to cases involving "wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale". The US claimed that China failed to honour its
TRIPs commitments by including in its IP laws high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties. These thresholds, the US argued, provided a safe harbour for
pirates and counterfeiters to avoid criminal prosecution.
China denied the charge by pointing out that the country had in place a parallel
enforcement system that subjects all infringements to enforcement. Due to limited
resources and a different socio-legal tradition, criminal enforcement handles serious
cases, while administrative enforcement deals with low-scale infringements.
As China successfully pointed out, the calculation of thresholds is rather complicated. Unlike the simple thresholds alleged by the US, the thresholds at issue are calculated over a prolonged period of time - say, five years. Those thresholds also take
into account Chinese criminal law on joint liability, criminal groups and accomplices.
The key to resolving this part of the dispute, ultimately, surrounds the term "commercial scale", which is undefined in TRIPs and includes both qualitative and quantitative elements. Although the US proposed a definition based on its case law and
recently negotiated free trade agreements, the panel rejected such a proposal and
looked instead to the specific conditions of China's marketplace. Because the US was
only able to provide evidence in press articles, the panel found the evidence insufficient and held for China.
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enforcement and the second looked at the related area of market
access for books, films and music. The cases
immediately led to a war of words between
the two countries and a slowdown incooperation on IPissues. The controversy did not end
with the panel decisions, which were published inJanuary and August this year. Both
were long, complex and sometimes impenetrable - with both sides claiming victory on certain points. But when you decode the complex
legal language of the decisions, there are a
number of important lessons for IPowners
and governments to learn about how to use
the WTO process and how to protect your
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Disposal of infringing goods
The second claim concerned the ability of the Chinese Customs authorities to dispose of confiscated infringing goods properly. Under TRIPs, each member state is
required to empower its judicial authorities to order the uncompensated destruction
or disposal of those goods.
Targeting this empowerment obligation, the US argued that the Chinese Customs
provisions introduced a "compulsory sequence" that took away the authorities' discretion to order destruction or disposal of the seized goods. As the US claimed, the
authorities could not destroy the infringing goods unless they found it inappropriate
to donate the goods to charities, sell them back to the rights holders or auction them
off after eradicating the infringing features.
China responded by pointing out that the sequence was flexible and merely
expressed an official preference for disposal methods. China Customs, therefore, still
has wide discretion to determine whether criteria are met.
Interestingly, because China extended border measures to all forms of infringeWWW.MANAGINGIP.COM
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ment (as compared to only piracy and counterfeiting), the
WTO panel found that China had provided more protection
than was required by TRIPs. The panel also upheld the use of
donations and sales, noting the flexibility for a WTO member
to introduce additional measures not mentioned by the
Agreement.
Nevertheless, the panel faulted China for the way it used
auctions. As the TRIPs Agreement states clearly, "the simple
removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient ... to permit release of the goods into the channels of

dispute, WTO panel decisions unfortunately do not lend themselves to such findings. In fact, by cutting the baby in half, the
WTO panel successfully avoided picking a winner and a loser
in this case. It is therefore no surprise that neither side
appealed the decision to the Appellate Body.
An important question remains, however: Could the resolution of this dispute be translated into substantive improvements in IP protection and enforcement in China? The answer,
unfortunately, is negative.

Limitations of the WTO panel decision
Even if the US had prevailed on all three

In China administrative enforcement can be
more effective than criminl
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certain circumstances and outside the big cities
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commerce". Although China provided additional measures,
such as the solicitation of comments from rights holders and
the introduction of a reserve price, those measures, in the
panel's view, did not provide an effective deterrent to piracy
and counterfeiting.

Copyright protection for censored works
The third claim concerned article 4 of the Chinese Copyright
Law, which denies copyright protection to works that have
been banned for publication, distribution or both. By denying
protection to banned works, China, the US claimed, failed to
offer protection to copyright holders as required by the Berne
Convention and TRIPs. The provision also contravened the
Convention by subjecting copyrighted works to the formalities
of a successful conclusion of content review.
China countered that the Berne Convention did not affect a
country's sovereign right "to permit, to control, or to prohibit
... the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or
production". In addition, China claimed that public regulations have pre-empted private economic rights and that censorship laws offered more secure protection than copyright.
Indeed, if a work is banned for distribution, the ban would
apply to both the copyright owners and the potential
infringers.
In the end, the WTO panel found article 4 of the Chinese
Copyright Law inconsistent with TRIPs. As the panel
explained, China cannot deny copyright protection to copyrighted works even though it has a sovereign right to prohibit
the publication or distribution of those works. In addition, the
panel found that China failed to provide sufficient evidence
that the rights holders will obtain greater protection through
censorship regulations than copyright law. It also stated that
the availability of an alternative form of protection did not
diminish a country's TRIPs obligations,

Release of the panel report
Immediately following the release of the panel report, both
sides were quick to declare success. As the Acting US Trade
Representative, maintained: "These findings are an important
victory, because they confirm the importance of IPR protection
and enforcement, and clarify key enforcement provisions of
the TRIPs Agreement." The response by a spokesperson of the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, by contrast, was more subdued. Although he welcomed the report's findings on criminal
thresholds, he "expressed 'regret' about the unfavourable
aspects of the ruling".
While it is attractive to find winners and losers in a legal
40 1 OCTOBER 2009 WVW,.MANAG1NGIP.COM

claims - a rather unusual outcome in a
WTO dispute - the victory would have
been rather empty. The successful chal-

lenge to article 4 of Chinese Copyright
Law was at best a symbolic, if not aca.
demic, victory. Because the provision has
not been used in any case before, its impact on IP rights owners is likely to be minimal. In fact, many Chinese commentators have already acknowledged that the provision was unnecessary.
With respect to the second claim, although the prohibition
of auctions, on its face, has greatly strengthened protection for
rights owners, the ruling, in reality, has only minimal impact
on IP protection and enforcement. As the WTO panel
acknowledged, the panel ruling concerns only imports, which
represented a mere 0.15% by value of the infringing goods disposed of or destroyed in China between 2005 and 2007. Even
more problematically, although the use of auctions constituted
2
% of all disposals, none of the confiscated infringing imports
were auctioned off.
Equally disturbing is the US's eagerness to challenge the
sequence in the Chinese Customs provisions. As experienced
China businesspeople could attest, local protectionism remains
one of the biggest enforcement challenges in China. The more
discretion there is, the more likely local protectionism and corruption will occur.
With the ongoing decentralisation of the Chinese central
government, measures that curtail discretion might be in the
interest of rights owners, even if they sound draconian under
US standards. Had the US succeeded in introducing more discretion at the local and provincial levels, they might have hurt
rights holders without realising the potential harm.
Finally, a victory along the line of criminal procedures and
penalties is not likely to benefit rights owners, unless criminal
enforcement always provides a more effective deterrent than
administrative enforcement. In China, for example, administrative enforcement can be more effective than criminal
enforcement under certain circumstances and outside the big
cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. The latter is
also cheaper, quicker, more flexible and less antagonistic.
Moreover, the presence of a parallel enforcement system
may suggest limited new developments even if China failed to
provide the required criminal measures. After all, TRIPs cannot prevent a WTO member from relabeling its administrative
measures criminal. As Brazil rightly recognised in its third
party submission, it is rather formalistic to require China to
provide criminal enforcement in place of administrative
enforcement.

Lessons for government
In my opinion, this WTO challenge was rather ill-advised.
From the very beginning, many commentators, including
myself, advocated against such a challenge. Nevertheless, the

panel decision still offers some important benefits to both on China's compliance with WTO commitments. It is no wonder that the US was unable to muster up sufficient evidence to
China and the US.
For example, the US sent an effective signal to China about challenge the thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties.
its willingness to use the WTO process, which in turn might
lead to further negotiations both within and without the IP The market access challenge
area. The US also learned more about China's legal reasoning, Most recently, the WTO dispute settlement body released a
its WTO strategies and how the WTO panels would look at report concerning the US-China dispute over the trading rights
China's unique legal structure and measures (such as judicial and distribution services for publications, sound recordings
interpretations). Most importantly, the US and its rights hold- and audiovisual entertainment products. That report faulted
ers successfully obtained detailed information about how the China for its failure to open up the market for cultural and
censorship process and Customs procedures work in practice.
Meanwhile, China understood better For
its TRIPs obligations through the eyes of
a neutral third party. For the reformist i
fractions within the Chinese leadership, important push for stronger reforms within the
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leadership, the panel decision provided an
country

the panel decision provided an important
push for stronger reforms within the
country. Most importantly, China's participation in the WTO process helped the country raise what
some might call its "WTO game". Learning how to play this
game well is particularly important, because the present dispute
is likely to be the first of a long series of IP-related challenges
the US intends to initiate against China in the near future.

Lessons for IP owners

entertainment products. Its findings provide not only hope for
IP owners in the publishing and entertainment industries, but
also additional lessons on how to strengthen protection for IP
interests in China.
Although IP protection and enforcement remains inadequate in China, strengthening protection is not the only, or
even the most preferable, route to protecting these interests. If
the ultimate objective of the WTO challenge is to increase
market access - as is often the case in US-China IP negotiations
- it may be more advisable to push China to honour the market access commitments it made before the WTO accession.
After all, any unfavourable findings by WTO panels in the IP
area will affect not only China but also the European
Communities and other developing countries.
Moreover, the fact that governments might find it illadvised to launch a WTO challenge against China on IP
enforcement grounds does not mean that they would hold the
same view toward a similar challenge on market access
grounds. Indeed, it is not unusual to find both Chinese leaders
and commentators bitterly divided over those two issues. It
therefore may not be a good strategy to lump the two issues
together, even though both issues are equally important to IP
owners.
The WTO panel decisions provide some helpful protections for IP owners. The market access decision, in particular, helps open up the Chinese market for publications, sound
recordings and audiovisual entertainment products.
Nevertheless, the IP landscape in China remains largely
unchanged. If IP protection and enforcement in the country
is to be improved dramatically, it needs more than a single
WTO challenge on IP issues.

The panel decision also provided valuable lessons to IP owners. First, enforcement is controversial at both the domestic
and international levels. It is no coincidence that minimum
international enforcement standards were not introduced into
any multilateral agreement until the signing of TRIPs. It is also
no surprise that developing countries remain reluctant to
explore stronger enforcement standards at both the WTO and
WIPO. Indeed, the enforcement issue was so controversial that
developing countries pushed for a provision in TRIPs that
states explicitly that WTO members are not required to devote
more resources to IP enforcement than other areas of law
enforcement.
Second, stronger enforcement cannot be developed out of
IP laws alone. It requires the development of what I have
called "an enabling environment for effective intellectual property protection". Such an environment includes key preconditions for successful IP reforms, such as a consciousness of legal
rights, a respect for the rule of law, an effective and independent judiciary, a well-functioning innovation and competition
system, sufficiently developed basic infrastructure, established
business practices and a critical mass of local stakeholders.
Third, the WTO dispute settlement process has its limits.
Although US industries have high hopes that this mandatory
process will provide the needed antidote to the decade-old
piracy and counterfeiting problems in China, WTO decisions
are lengthy, complex and detailed. Each party in the dispute is As Managing IP
likely to score some important points. A better and more reliable solution, therefore, is
to focus on the bottom-up developments in
the country and to facilitate greater collaboration between US industries and Chinese
stakeholders.
Fourth, rights holders need to be proactive if IP protection in China is to be
Where to sue in-China, June 2009
strengthened. There is only so much a govThe tasks of Tian,
February 2009
ernment can do on their behalf. For all the
Protect your secrets inChina, February
complaints they made, the US Trade
2009
Representative obtained only 34 submissions
Politics and IPin China explained,
October 2008
pursuant to its initial request for comments

went to press, an official at China's WTO
mission confirmed that China will appeal

the August 2009 WTO panel decision on
market access for publications, sound
recordings and audiovisual products.

On managingip.com

Peter KYu
© Peter KYu 2009. The author holds the Kern
Family Chair inIntellectual Property Law and is
the founding director of the IP Law Center at
Drake University Law School inthe US

WWW.MANAGINGIP.COM OCTOBER 20091 41

COVER STORY: THE FUTURE OF THE PCT
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The PCT was designed to benefit applicants and offices
by minimising duplication in the patent system. More
than 30 years on, is it still up to the job?
reports
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